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A WHOLE LOT OF SUBSTANCE
OR A WHOLE LOT OF RHETORIC?
A PERSPECTIVE ON A
WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH
TO SECURITY CHALLENGES
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.
The Department [of Defense] supports institutional-
izing whole-of-government approaches to addressing
national security challenges. The desired end state
is for u.s. Government national security partners to
develop plans and conduct operations from a shared
perspective.
Quadrennial Defense Roles
and Missions Review Report, 20091
INTRODUCTION
In the U.S. Government, the "whole of govern-
ment" mantra is firmly embedded in official rhetoric
as the idea-du-jour. Moreover, as the quote above indi-
cates, in the national security realm particularly, it is
officially considered a bedrock principle.
Indeed, the Obama administration - building on
themes developed previously by the Bush and Clinton
administrations2 -explicitly incorporates a whole of
government (WoG) approach in the National Security
Strategy issued in May of 2010.3 In the administration's
conceptualization, a WoG approach in the national se-
curity sphere essentially involves, among other things,
greater coordination across government agencies, and
a marked expansion of diplomatic and civilian devel-
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opment capabilities. Military and civilian institutions
are, the strategy insists, to "complement each other
and operate seamlessly."4
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly trace the
application of the WoG approach to security issues,
highlight a few of its strengths and weaknesses, and
examine the potential unintended consequences. It
will argue that while a WoG approach certainly has its
merits, it is not-and never will be-a panacea. More-
over, this chapter contends that in some instances a
unilateral approach, that is, one that wholly or pri-
marily relies upon a particular agency, is the preferred
or only practical alternative. The chapter will also
suggest that when extended to the domestic context,
a WoG approach strategy may be unsettling, and even
counterproductive, to the Nation's long-term strategic
and political interests.
Finally, this chapter advocates considering a WoG
approach as just one tool in the smart power toolbox.
It argues that as such, a WoG approach is most effec-
tive when selectively employed, and not as a default
in all circumstances.
IRREGULAR WAR AND THE RISE OF THE WoG
APPROACH
As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) re-
cently observed, for "well over a decade, there has
been Widespread concern that the U.S. government
lacks appropriate civilian 'tools' to carry out state-
building tasks in post conflict situations."5 Operations
in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere were cited
as examples of situations where it fell to America's
armed forces to perform a variety of state-building
tasks"such as creating justice systems, assisting po-
lice, and promoting governance."6
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The February 2011 report points out:
The military was called upon to perform such mis-
sions not only for its extensive resources but also be-
cause no other U.S. government agency could match
the military's superior planning and organizational
capabilities. In addition, because of its manpower, the
military carried out most of the U.S. humanitarian and
nation-building contribution, even though some believed
that civilians might be better suited to carry out such tasks,
especially those tasks involving cooperation with hu-
manitarian NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]?
Still, the current impetus for a WoG approach is
much traceable to reconstruction and stability issues
arising out of the irregular wars in Iraq and Afghani-
stan. Defined by the Pentagon as a "violent struggle
among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and
influence over the relevant population(s),"8 irregu-
lar war was exactly what the Department of Defense
(DoD) found itself fighting after toppling the Baathist
government of Iraq, and the Taliban regime in Af-
ghanistan.
The DoD may have anticipated security issues, but
it seems clear that it nevertheless expected that once
the conventional fight ended, the task of physically re-
constructing the country and rebuilding its economic
societal institutions - essential elements of strategic
victory in irregular war - would be the responsibility
of other government agencies and the international
community.
Things, however, did not work out that way. Ac-
cording to analyst Gordon Adams, although "whole of
government" was among the "buzz words" that arose
in direct response to the post-major combat operations
stage in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DoD found itself:
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frustrated by the absence of a significant, flexible,
well-funded civilian capacity at the State Department
and USAID [U.s. Agency for International Develop-
ment], able to take responsibility for post-conflict re-
construction and stabilization after U.S. combat opera-
tions concluded.9
That, it seems, was enough for the DoD to take mat-
ters into its own hands.
DoD authorities responded by attempting a rather
significant re-orientation of the armed forces to fill the
perceived post-conflict reconstruction and stabiliza-
tion capability gap. In late-2005, the DoD issued a di-
rective entitled Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR).lO Designed to
support President Bush's National Security Presiden-
tial Directive (NSPD)-44,l1 this watershed policy docu-
ment (designated Department of Defense Directive
[DoDD] 3000.05) declared that stability operations are
a "core U.s. military mission" and one that, according
to the directive, was to be II given a priority compa-
rable to combat operations."12
That document was followed in 2008 by the Army's
own Stability Operations manual which implemented
the DoD policy.13 The Army's manual contained an
explicit definition of the WoG approach, describing it
rather amorphously as an IIapproach that integrates
the collaborative efforts of the departments and agen-
cies of the u.s. government to achieve unity of effort
toward a shared goal."14
In accord with DoDD 3000.05, the 2006 Quadren-
nial Defense Revie'w (QDR) did not use WoG approach
terminology, but said as much in declaring that:
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The Department of Defense cannot meet today's com-
plex challenges alone. Success requires unified state-
craft: the ability of the U.s. Government to bring to
bear all elements of national power at home and to
work in close cooperation with allies and partners
abroad.15
These sentiments were echoed in the 2009 Quadren-
nial Defense Roles and Missions Review ReportJ6 wherein
the DoD affirms its support for the "maturation of
whole-of-government approaches to national security
problems," adding that any solution such an approach
produces will "be based on employing integrated flex-
ible/ mutually-supporting interagency capabilities."l?
For its part, the 2010 QDR is replete with specific refer-
ences to the WoG approach.18
In the meantime, however, the Army and the Ma-
rine Corps also issued their counterinsurgency (COIN)
doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-24/ which became the
"bible" for operations in Iraq and later Afghanistan.19
A multifaceted document subject to a myriad of in-
terpretations/ it was popularly imagined as a kinder,
gentler way of achieving success in COIN situations
by eschewing violence against insurgents in favor of a
population-centric strategy aimed at winning "hearts
and minds/" much through nation-building and re-
construction efforts. Journalist Steve CoIl described it
thusly in the New Yorker:
[Popular] among sections of the country's liberal-
minded intelligentsia. This was warfare for northeast-
ern graduate students-complex, blended with poli-
tics, designed to build countries rather than destroy
them, and fashioned to minimize violence. It was a
doctrine with particular appeal to people who would
never own a gun.20
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It is also a doctrine that, on the face of it, is perfectly
suited to a WoG approach. In fact, it devotes an entire
chapter to integrating civilian and military e££orts.21
Nevertheless, the doctrine makes it clear that nation-
building tasks are essential for COIN success and, if
necessary, the military must endeavor to accomplish
them even in the absence of civilian partners. That cir-
cumstance occurred. For example, commanders were
obliged to turn to their "in-house counsel" (uniformed
military lawyers called Judge Advocates or "JAGs")
for even such activities as rule of law reconstitution-
a task that would appear to be better conducted by
civilian personne1.22
Unsurprisingly, therefore, when DoDD 3000.05
was re-issued in 2009, the DoD acknowledged the im-
portance of civilian partners, but reiterated that the
DoD must be prepared to take the "lead" in such ac-
tivities as establishing civil security and civil control,
restoring essential services, repairing, and protecting
critical infrastructure, and delivering humanitarian
assistance until it is feasible for another agency to take
over.23
THE MERITS OF A WoG APPROACH
Taken at face value, the notion of exploiting all the
government's potential in the service of national secu-
rity is eminently reasonable and wise. Plainly, nation-
al defense is the most basic rationale for government.
Our own Constitution cites"provide for the common
defence" as one of the key responsibilities of govern-
ment. 24 Accordingly, the judicious bringing to bear of
government's full range of capabilities is consistent
with the fundamentals of good government and wise
defense policy.
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Perhaps most important- but not often dis-
cussed-are the merits of the military not doing
many of the nation-building and reconstruction tasks.
Among other things, if not engaged in nation-build-
ing, the military could concentrate on its institutional
responsibility for national defense, particularly with
respect to existential threats which nation-building
and reconstruction do not address.25
After all, the role of the armed forces is, as the Su-
preme Court put it, II to fight or be ready to fight wars
should the occasion arise."26 Moreover, the Court
points out that II [t]o the extent that those responsible
for performance of this primary function are diverted
from it ... the basic fighting purpose of armies is not
served."27 Therefore, when the armed forces divert
resources and-of even greater concern-focus, to the
conduct of operations not intrinsic to warfighting,
their ability to conduct bona fide combat operations
inevitably degrades.
There are, however, other important factors fa-
voring a WoG approach. As talented as military per-
sonnel are, it seems obvious that the more facets of
the u.s. Government that can be brought to bear, the
more likely there will be an injection of an authentic
expertise when the task is not a traditionally mili-
tary one. On the other hand, while the armed forces
may have manpower and resources to address many
nation-building tasks, that does not necessarily mean
that they possess the range and depth of experience
required to solve the convoluted problems arising in
civil society.
As just one example, consider that the military is
instinctively authoritarian and, as the Supreme Court
has drily observed," the army is not a deliberative
body," rather II it is, by necessity, a specialized soci-
ety separate from civilian society." How could such
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an organization have the experience and mindset to
establish courts and legislatures where the essence of
their function is deliberation?
In addition, there is another important consider-
ation, which is the psychological impact on the host
nation of a foreign military leading these efforts.
Many in America's military seem blissfully unaware
of the image they may unintentionally present when
they serve as the "face" of the United States in nation-
building endeavors. One can only imagine what the
residents of a failed nation think when they see people
in uniforms - not civilian officials - as the ones who
are the main representatives of the United States in
the reestablishment of their society's institutions, to
include those expected to exercise civilian control of
the armed forces.28 Regrettably, the population may
assume, for example, that it is military direction (as
opposed to civilian leadership) that leads to success
in the modern world. This could have unwanted po-
litical consequences over time if the electorate comes
to perceive the armed forces as preferable to civilian
leadership.
Closer to home, there are other benefits to remov-
ing the armed forces from the conduct of nation-build-
ing activities not directly involving physical security
or military operations against insurgents. Specifically,
the long-term involvement in such activities in Iraq
and Afghanistan may be causing a subtle but troubling
change in the perspective of members of America's
armed forces. In 2006, historian Douglas Porch-cit-
ing the work of British historian Hew Strachan- made
this melancholy observation:
Politicians who engage in nation building endeavors,
especially those with a counterinsurgency dimen-
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sion must be prepared to deal with the political and
military professional fallout. This includes the evo-
lution of a stab-in-the-back as a guiding principle of
civil-military relations and its leaching into domestic
politics - that is, the belief that, in modern counterin-
surgency warfare, win or lose, the military ends up
feeling betrayed by the civilians. 29
We may be beginning to see this phenomenon,
much because of the way operations have been con-
ducted in current wars. As this writer has observed
elsewhere:
Given responsibility not only for security, but also for
governance, education, and economic development
in wide swaths of territory in Iraq and Afghanistan,
a generation of US officers has become accustomed to
being f warrior kings'.30
As such, there is a real risk that even after their nation-
building duties in contingency areas end, military of-
ficers may want to arrogate to themselves decision-
making that democracies leave to civilians.
A disturbing manifestation of what might be an
emerging mindset is found in an October 2010 article
written by Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Andrew
Milburn that was published in the prestigious military
journal, Joint Force Quarterly.31 Milburn made the un-
precedented argument that military officers have the
obligation to disobey even lawful orders if they sub-
jectively decide that such orders are "likely to harm
the institution writ large- the Nation, military, and
subordinates - in a manner not clearly outweighed by
its likely benefits."32 While the notion of disobedience
of lawful orders is an anathema to most officers, it is
nevertheless true, as journalist David Wood observes,
that many uniformed officers today are chafing for a
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"bigger role in [the] policy decisions" that historically
have been the province of civilian decisionmakers.33
Importantly for a WoG approach analysis, Wood
maintains that the"current unrest among midcareer
officers is new" and reasons that:
today's majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels grew
up in counterinsurgency warfare, leading men into
combat as young platoon leaders and having to create
new ways of operating in dangerously complex politi-
cal and social environments never imagined by their
elders.34
As such, it may be that traditional- and critical- con-
cepts of appropriate civil-military relations are under
stress at least to some degree because of the nation-
building tasks which military officers have had to per-
form in the absence of civilian capability that a WoG
approach might otherwise provide.
In short, a WoG approach that displaces reliance
upon the armed forces as the principle agent of nation-
building and post-conflict reconstitution may well
serve the interests of the targeted nation by better por-
traying the role of civilians in a democracy, serve the
interests of the U.s. armed forces by allowing greater
focus on its quintessential warfighting responsibilities,
and also serve American society itself by ameliorat-
ing burgeoning civil-military tensions. Nevertheless,
implementing a WoG approach effectively involves
substantial challenges.
WoG APPROACH CHALLENGES
Although Congress has grappled with the idea
of building civilian capability for nation-building
for most of the decade, numerous difficulties still ex-
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ist to implementing a WoG approach - not the least
of which are inadequate resourcing and authority.35
In 2004 the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruc-
tion and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created within the
State Department with a mission statement that would
seem ideally suited to relieving the military of much
of its current responsibility. S/CRS is supposed to:
lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.s. Government
civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict
situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societ-
ies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can
reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy,
and a market economy.36
The centerpiece of the S/CRS effort is the Civilian
Response Corps (CRC). Drawing experts from eight
Federal departments or agencies, the CRC is a /I group
of civilian federal employees who are specially trained
and equipped to deploy rapidly to provide reconstruc-
tion and stabilization assistance to countries in crisis
or emerging from conflict."37 Although Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton applauds the fact that in just 2
years the ranks have grown to over 1,000 civilian re-
sponders, the reality is that only 250-300 can deploy at
any given time.38
It is difficult to understand how such a relatively
small group - not much larger than a couple of com-
panies of soldiers - could possibly obviate the need
for substantial military involvement to accomplish the
same tasks. After all, Iraq39 and Afghanistan40 are both
nations of more than 29,000,000 people. Even with re-
serves - which Congress has not funded - the whole
CRC was never contemplated to number more than a
few thousand persons.
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According to the S/CRS/ IImany analysts have ex-
pressed doubt about S/CRS ability and capacity to
carry out its mission."41 Some of that doubt is blamed
on a II perceived lack of funding by Congress/" but
there are also misgivings about an IIanti-operational
social culture in the State Department."42 There seems
to be real difficulty with a program that depends upon
large numbers of highly-expert civilians voluntarily
agreeing to serve in austere and dangerous circum-
stances. This appears to be an impediment, with trou-
bling and perhaps intractable implications for future
operations.
As evidence of this issue, consider a 2007 New York
Times article reporting that many diplomats and For-
eign Service employees of the State Department re-
fused assignments to Iraq.43 Steve Kashkett, vice pres-
ident of the American Foreign Service Association/
insisted that" there remain legitimate questions about
the ability of unarmed civilian diplomats to carry out
a reconstruction and democracy-building mission in
the middle of an active war zone."44
As a result, the Times says that those employees
who did agree to deploy IItended to be younger, more
entry-level types, and not experienced, seasoned dip-
lomats."45 The former head of S/CRS recognizes the
problem and admitted in a March 2010 interview that
lithe State Department must shed the frisk-averse cul-
ture' it adopted in the mid-1980s."46 He added/ IIObvi-
ously, you cannot ignore risk, but we need to be will-
ing to manage risk rather than simply avoid it."47
Other government employees seem to carry a rath-
er robustly different sense of entitlement when serv-
ing in war zones, and this can complicate a WoG ap-
proach. For example/ a 2008 audit found that Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents were improperly
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paid millions of dollars in overtime while on 90 days
of temporary duty in Iraq.48 This investigation found
that the agents billed the government on average
$45,000 overtime pay, often for simply watching mov-
ies, exercising, or even attending parties.49
Civilians clearly want to be well paid if they work
in dangerous areas. Journalist Nathan Hodge writes
that when anthropologists, hired to conduct analysis
of the "human terrain" in Iraq and Afghanistan, were
converted from "well-compensated contractor status"
to government employee status, "around a third of the
program's deployed workforce quit."50
Besides manning issues, recent reports from Af-
ghanistan about program execution are not encourag-
ing.51 Critics insist that SICRS remains poorly funded
and is often ignored.52 Consequently, reporter Spencer
Ackerman says that in Afghanistan"American diplo-
macy and development work in conflict areas remains
largely a military job."53 He says that u.s. soldiers-
not American civilians -"politic with local potentates
on reconstruction projects."54 Thinking beyond the
specific difficulties with SICRS, the issue may become
this: Can a WoG approach work at all in the U.S. Gov-
ernment?
Analyst Todd Moss has his doubts. The former
State Department official acknowledges that a WoG
approach may work in other nations, but has reser-
vations about its prospects in the United States. Moss
says:
in the United States-with its sprawling federal struc-
ture and huge agency staffs and budget-just getting
everyone around one table is perhaps too much to ask.
The interagency process in any country is a strain.
[Managing those tensions is actually what policymak-
ing is all about.] Yet the process can become convolut-
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ed and bogged down when the scale is out of whack.
Simply put: when you have too many people at the
table, nothing gets done.55
It may be that a WoG approach can suffer from
a form of the same malady as that which debilitated
American corporations late in the last century, that
is, over-diversification. Many companies acquired
widely-diverse businesses and put them under the
umbrella of a single conglomerate, apparently think-
ing that the mutual support of the whole would be
stronger and more profitable than the individual
parts. One can readily see how such thinking would
resonate with WoG approach goals. Unfortunately I it
often does not work.
Notwithstanding what might be called a IIwhole
of business'l approachl the Economist observes that the
idea "went out of fashion in the 1980s and 1990s ...
when companies began to see again the virtues of
I sticking to their knitting' ."56 Sometimesl it seems, a
single-focused entity is better at a specific task than an
assemblage of actors with assorted backgrounds. Con-
glomerates that did succeed were ones that expanded
but did not stray far from their core competencies. The
chief executive of Bombardier, a Canadian manufac-
turing firm that acquired new businesses, did so by
ensuring that II each new sector we entered shares cer-
tain fundamental similarities.1I57
This may mean that a WoG approach may need
modification, or at least clarification. Not every secu-
rity issue needs-or profits from-the application of
all the tools in the proverbial toolbox. In some circum-
stancesl a WoG approach may be exactly the wrong
strategy; not every agency has the requisite core com-
petencies to add value to the resolution of a particu-
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lar national security issue. If it is necessary to have a
bumper sticker for such a more nuanced approach,
then smart power may be it.
THE BETTER CONCEPTUALIZATION FOR THE
WAY AHEAD?
Secretary Clinton's articulation of smart power
shows it is related tOt but not exactly coterminous with,
a WaG approach. Although she does not claim to have
invented the smart power term, in her 2009 confirma-
tion testimony she defined it as using the "range of
tools at our disposal- diplomatic, economic, military,
political, legal, and cultural'/ to address international
issues.58 It does not seek to bring every tool to bear in
every instance; rather, smart power is about "picking
the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situa-
tion.// 59 Importantly, Clinton says that under a smart
power approach, "diplomacy will be the vanguard of
foreign policy.//60
Ta be sure, Clinton is not foreswearing a WaG
approach; however, she does seem to conceive it dif-
ferently than has previously been the case. Writing in
the November/December 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs,
Secretary Clinton elaborated on her smart power con-
cept and its distinct emphasis on civilian power:61
By drawing on the pool of talent that already exists in
U.s. federal agencies and at overseas posts, the United
States can build a global civilian service of the same
caliber and flexibility as the U.s. military.62
In addition to its civilian focus, there is much about
the particulars of smart power worth noting carefully.
As already observed, it recognizes that sometimes
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"picking the right tool" suffices. If the number of par-
ticipants can be minimized! the hazards of navigating
the interagency coordination process that concerned
Mr. Moss might diminish.63 Moreover, it suggests that
there can be affirmative benefits of discrete approach-
es by separate government agencies. Consider the U.s.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) experience.
AFRICOM might be considered one of the most
aggressive models of at least a modified form of a WoG
approach. Established in 2007! it represents an innova-
tive effort by the DoD to address the varied needs of
a multifaceted continent.6-± It sees itself as a "different
kind of command" because it is fashioned with a:
much more integrated staff structure ... that includes
significant management and staff representation by
the Department of State, u.s. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and other u.s. government
agencies involved in Africa.65
One of the most unique aspects of AFRICOM is its
leadership arrangements. Unlike any other military
organization, it designates a State Department ambas-
sador as its "co-equal" deputy.66 Notwithstanding the
language of co-equality, AFRICOM makes it clear that
the ambassador!s military counterpart-a Navy admi-
ral-exercises command authority in the AFRICOM
commander's absence only because "U.s. law does
not allow a State Department official to hold military
command authority."67 Despite the absence of legal
authority to command, AFRICOM says the"co-equal"
State Department official nevertheless"directs" a vari-
ety of military activities! including disaster relief and,
somewhat mysteriously, "security sector reform."68
The precise distinction between a civilian with au-
thority to "direct" and a military officer empowered
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to "command" is unexplained and puzzling. While no
one questions the value of close working relationships
with the Department of State, there is a point at which
the intermingling in pursuit of an undifferentiated
WoG approach becomes an unproductive infatuation
that could dangerously confuse the military chain of
command in a crisis. Even more importantly, it may
send the wrong message about our diplomats around
the globe whose legal status and safety depends upon
the perception and reality that they are noncombatant
civilians apart from our military forces.
According to a 2009 U.S. Government Account-
ability Office (GAO) report, various stakeholders
raised similar issues. They were concerned that AFRI-
COM"could blur traditional boundaries between di-
plomacy, development, and defense." 69 Likewise, the
S/CRS reports "mixed feelings" among many about
AFRICOM:
While many at the State Department and USAID wel-
come the ability of DOD to leverage resources and to
organize complex operations, there also is concern
that the military may overestimate its capabilities as
well as its diplomatic role, or pursue activities that are
not a core part of its mandate.7°
Both the GAO and the S/CRS also report concerns
that the size of the DoD IIcould dominate U.s. activi-
ties and relationships in Africa" to the detriment of
foreign policy.71 Essentially, the apprehension was
that the command might unproductively "militarize
diplomacy and development" on the continent. 72 In
response, AFRICOM emphasized a WoG approach-
with some success. 73 A subsequent GAO report
showed AFRICOM made progress, but effective col-
laboration remains a daunting issue despite the re-
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markable integration of representatives of some 27
agencies.74
The best intentions can, nevertheless, create issues.
For example, apparently AFRICOM originally saw
as part of its mission the task to "improve account-
able governance" of African states.75 Exactly what that
was supposed to mean remains unclear, but when
the most fearsome military in the world starts talking
about "improving" what it may decide is a sovereign
nation's accountability, it is no wonder that the com-
mand has yet to find a horne in any country on the
continent. The notion of Americans" improving" gov-
ernments via a military command is an understand-
ably alarming concept to many nations, especially in
the shadow of U.s. "regime change" operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
No doubt it is a worthy aim of the United States
to assist nations with bettering their govermnents, but
this is a classic example of an area where America's
armed forces ought to steer clear, and a WoG ap-
proach is affirmatively counterproductive. Africa has
an unfortunate history of militaries "improving" gov-
ernments by crushing the existing ones in the name
of reform. AFRICOM certainly would not do so, but
the juxtaposition of an intent to "improve accountable
governance" with a military command invites untow-
ard perceptions. Such a task may be appropriate for
diplomats and civilian agencies to facilitate, in concert
with other nations, international bodies, and NGOs,
but not our military.
Clearly, the case for a U.s. military command fo-
cused on Africa is a good one, but trying to mix the
armed forces and all it implies with activities better
carried out via a distinctly diplomatic or civilian en-
tity is obviously problematic. In this instance it ap-
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pears that smart power must suggest a disaggregation
of the respective functions that might better serve u.s.
interests than the present WoG approach formulation.
Mating a military entity with a diplomatic function
could too readily serve to create unnecessary suspi-
cions about u.s. intentions.
AFRICOM is not, however, the only example of
questionable utilization of WoG approach-style think-
ing (if not precise application of WoG approach termi-
nology). Specifically, recent domestic counterterrorism
efforts have employed a WoG approach. Despite what
Harvard Law professor Jack Goldsmith calls"strong
sub-constitutional norms against military involve-
ment in homeland security," 76 the powerful technical
surveillance capabilities of the DoD National Security
Agency (NSA) have increasingly been brought to bear
domestically to ferret out terrorism threats, as well as
to address growing risks to cyber security.
Unfortunately, to the extent a WoG approach in-
volves the military in domestic security activities, his-
tory does not provide much encouragement. In the
1960s, for example, military intelligence officers, in the
name of national security, were enlisted to collect per-
sonal information on tens of thousands of Americans
who, in reality, "posed no real threat to national secu-
rity ."77 The military deployed - domestically _"more
than 1,500 plainclothes agents to watch demonstrators,
infiltrate organizations, and circulate blacklists." 78 As
a result of the ensuing furor, congressional oversight
increased,79 and legislation such as the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted.80
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of September 11,
2001 (9/11), NSA capabilities were used for domestic
surveillance in contravention to FISA requirements.
When this illegal activity was revealed, the NSA was
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sued successfully, and on December 2010 was ordered
to pay $2.5 million in attorney fees and damages.81 De-
spite this experience, the NSA recently signed a first-
of-its kind WoG approach-style agreement with the
Department of Homeland Security to collaborate in
protecting civilian infrastructure from cyber attacks.
82 Although steps are being taken to protect privacy,
civil liberty advocates remain skeptica1.83
All this is important because if such domestic
WoG approaches to security strategies involving the
military go awry, they could put in jeopardy vital gov-
ernment interests. The U.S. armed forces are an all-
volunteer force (AVF) depending upon the affection
and respect of the American people to ensure that suf-
ficient high-quality recruits choose uniformed service.
Currently, the military enjoys extremely high levels
of public confidence84 and respect,85 and that contrib-
utes immeasurably to the military's ability to sustain
itself.86
If that confidence and respect is compromised by
perceptions about illegal military involvement in ac-
tivities that implicate civil liberties, the consequences
for the AVF may be serious. Too many potential re-
cruits may not want to involve themselves in a mili-
tary organization that may appear to be improperly
infringing upon the rights of citizens. Thus, as efficient
as a WoG approach may be in this arena, on balance it
may nevertheless be prudent as a matter of policy to
develop the necessary capabilities fully independent
of the armed forces.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
To be sure, a WoG approach should certainly be
considered in devising solutions to the complex secu-
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rity challenges of the 21st century. Yet it is those very
complexities that counsel against the undifferentiated
application of the concept. Clearly, the WoG approach
should not devolve into an insistence - or assump-
tion-that every entity of government has some role
to play in every national security issue. As discussed,
there are real merits in keeping certain activities sepa-
rate and, in any event, some activities are inappropri-
ate assignments for the armed forces. Hence, in smart
power terms, a WoG approach is just an option among
several, and one that may - or may not - be appropri-
ate for a given situation.
Although it is largely beyond the scope of this
chapter, some mention should be made as to the ef-
fectiveness of a WoG approach in its most common
and controversial application in the national security
arena: post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. It
is an article of faith among purveyors of contempo-
rary COIN theory that such WoG approach-oriented
activities are indispensible to a population-centric
strategy.87 That strategy, encompassed in FM 3-24,88
aims to win the loyalty of the populace to the central
government the counterinsurgents are supporting by
facilitating that government's nation-building pro-
grams.
Bernard Finel, a Senior Fellow and Director of Re-
search at the American Security Project, points out
that critics argue that a:
population-centric COIN [strategy] requires building
responsive governmental structures, promoting eco-
nomic growth, and eliminating endemic corruption-
objectives that have almost never been successfully
accomplished in the long, doleful history of interna-
tional development.89
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Increasingly, experts like Finel argue that an enemy-
centric approach is more effective and better suited to
American interests. It unapologetically aims to neu-
tralize the insurgents directly as a means to force" a
negotiated solution" - a result Finel argues is "consis-
tent with the vast majority of conflicts in history."9o
In an interview coinciding with the release of
his new book, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the
Way Out of Afghanistan, former DoD official-turned-
embedded-writer Bing West offers an unvarnished
assessment. Asked about the effectiveness of billions
spent on reconstruction, West says:
From [Afghan President] Karzai to the villagers, the
response has been rational: take or steal every dollar
the Americans are foolish enough to give away. In the
US, the Great Society and the War on Poverty created
a culture of entitlement and undercut individual re-
sponsibility. We exported that failed social philosophy
to Afghanistan.91
Indeed, West is harshly dismissive of nation-build-
ing and the military's role in it:
For 10 years, in Afghanistan, our new COIN doctrine
has focused upon building a nation, and has not been
successful. The COIN doctrine says our troops are
expected to be nation-builders as well as warriors. I
believe that is deeply flawed. Our military, despite
the exhortations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
should not be a Peace Corps.92
West's view, albeit undiplomatically stated, seems
to be consistent with the majority of Americans who
now consider the war in Afghanistan as something
the United States should "not be involved in."93 This
writer has long believed that the armed forces should
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focus on the all-important task of warfighting, and
avoid a variety of deleterious effects that can arise
when the military becomes enmeshed in nation-build-
ing and related tasks, as part of a WoG approach or
otherwise.94
Still, none of this is to say that a WoG approach is,
per se, flawed. It ought to always be considered when
addressing the multifaceted security issues of the 21st
century. Again, filtering its utility through the smart
power lens will likely find many opportunities where
it can be profitably employed. It is the overly-mecha-
nistic application of the concept of a WoG approach
that can be the source of mischief and misdirection.
In the end, there is no substitute for wise contem-
plation of which situations can profit from a WoG ap-
proach, and which are most optimally addressed by
another, single-entity tool. Such measured analysis of
specific situations will ensure that the WoG approach
methodology maintains substantive vitality and does
not devolve into another exercise of empty pseudo-
strategy. In that way, it can be a whole lot of substance,
and not simply a whole lot of rhetoric.
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